What H.R. 4988 Means for Cyber Risk Strategy

In an era where ransomware gangs, “pig-butchering” scams, and large-scale identity fraud continue to inflict billions of dollars of damage, defenders are increasingly frustrated. Much of the conversation in boardrooms and C-suite briefings now centers not just on defensive controls but on a provocative question: If the hacker won’t stop, should we hit back? The newly introduced Scam Farms Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act of 2025 (H.R. 4988) proposes to answer that question by empowering vetted private entities to operate under a presidential commission to attack, seize, or disrupt foreign criminal enterprises. This isn’t your standard incident-response playbook. It’s privateering: old-school letters of marque, revived for the digital age.

As cyber risk leaders guide clients, it’s critical to understand what the bill proposes, how it stacks up against earlier efforts, what the real risks are, and what you should do instead of dreaming of the “offensive switch.”

What the Scam Farms Act Proposes

H.R. 4988 would grant the President of the United States the power to issue “letters of marque and reprisal” to private persons and entities, authorized to act outside U.S. territory, to seize persons or property of any individual or foreign government determined by the President to be part of a “criminal enterprise … involved in cybercrime.”  The definition of “cybercrime” in the bill is extremely broad: unauthorized access, fraud, ransomware, identity theft, cryptocurrency theft, and more.

In its legislative justification, the bill cites losses of “more than $16 billion” from scam farms in 2024 and emphasizes the threat to both economic and national security. The justification frames the bill as a response to the scale and speed of global cybercrime, arguing that additional tools or authorities may be needed.

The bill faces significant practical, legal, and policy considerations. Some policy analysts have suggested that its current version may undergo significant debate and revision before any potential passage.

Comparison to Earlier Efforts: The ACDC Act & Hack Back Debate

This is not the first time the U.S. has considered private sector involvement in “hack back” authorities. The earlier Active Cyber Defense Certainty (ACDC) Act (proposed in 2019) would have allowed victim companies to take limited “active defense” measures such as monitoring attacker behavior or taking down attacker infrastructure, if they received advanced notification from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).

However, ACDC was never enacted, largely due to concerns around attribution, escalation, coordination with national cyber operations, and legal liability. The Scam Farms Act differs in one key aspect: It hands the power directly to the President to designate specific entities (criminal enterprises) and to deputize private actors, rather than opening a broad “any victim may hack back” posture.

So yes, the new bill is narrower, but only marginally so. It retains the same fundamental dangers that major policy experts continue to highlight.

Key Risks & Challenges for Organizations

For CISOs and risk leaders reading this, the core risks are where theory collides with reality.

Here are five of the most relevant:

1. Attribution Mistakes & Collateral Damage
   ‍Offensive cyber operations require near-perfect attribution, deep intelligence, and precise targeting. Mistakes could mean private entities targeting the wrong victim, or privateers being mistaken for state actors. The “hack back” debate emphasizes this risk heavily.
2. Escalation & Sovereignty
   ‍If a private entity authorized by the U.S. hacks into infrastructure abroad, how do foreign states respond? Do we risk kinetic escalation or diplomatic blowback? Comments on the bill warn that it “raises critical concerns about escalation, attribution, and collateral damage.”
3. ‍Oversight, Governance, & Due Process
   ‍Traditional cyber defense is governed by law enforcement or military frameworks, with procedural safeguards. Private actors operating under letters of marque have far less precedent. The bill’s text addresses “security bonds” and “suitable instructions,” but the practical oversight mechanisms remain undefined.
4. ‍Liability & Insurance Exposure
   ‍If a designated privateer exceeds its license, targets the wrong system, or disrupts civilian infrastructure, who is liable for the consequences? The commissioning entity? The private firm? The victim company? These questions remain unanswered, creating risk for vendors and clients alike.‍
5. Strategic Distraction vs. Resilience Focus
   ‍Perhaps most important for C-suite discussions: Even if the bill passes, ultra-complex and high-cost offensive operations are a distraction for most organizations. The real payoff remains in defense, detection, incident response, and collaboration with government agencies.

Why It Still Matters—Even If It Doesn’t Pass

Even if H.R. 4988 never becomes law, that doesn’t mean it’s irrelevant. Here’s why it matters:

• It signals a shift in mindset. Policymakers are now openly entertaining the idea of private sector offensive action. That alone changes how boards and CISOs must frame cyber risk.
• It raises the bar for threat actors. The discussion raises the possibility that threat actors may one day face pressure from both state and state-commissioned private operators, depending on future legal frameworks.
• It creates pressure for more mature public-private cyber cooperation. If private actors could ever be empowered this way, then the infrastructure (governance, intelligence sharing, escalation channels) must already exist. Organizations should use this as a wake-up call.
• It sharpens the argument for “defense not revenge” in practical security strategy. Rather than longing for private access to the attack toggle switch, organizations that focus on proactive detection, resilient architecture, and strategic collaboration will be better off.

When & How This Should Apply to Your Organization

Here are three practical triggers and strategic responses for organizations working in the CISO/risk-officer world:

• Board Briefings & Risk Posture
  Use this narrative to elevate the conversation. A significant legislative discussion is emerging that could influence how cyber adversary operations are structured. Make sure your board understands that “offensive capacity” may be a lever in national policy and what that means for your enterprise’s threat landscape.

• Third-Party Programs & Vendor Contracts
  If private firms could ever be authorized as commissioned cyber operators, companies need to revisit vendor risk, supply chain contracts, attribution clauses, legal indemnities, and crisis response alignment. Ensure your contracts anticipate scenarios where your service provider may be operating under novel legal authority.

• Incident Readiness & Escalation Channels
  Regardless of law passage, focus on how you would respond if an attacker assumed they could be blocked not just by law enforcement but also by private “cyber-agents.” Coordinate with legal counsel, intelligence partners, law enforcement liaisons (e.g., the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)) and ensure your incident-response plan reflects the possibility of more aggressive actors on both sides.

Focus on Resilience, Not Retaliation

As defenders of the cyber battlespace, you’re not going to wait for Congress to wave the definitive “go get ’em” flag. The posture of retaliatory hacking is seductive but the real advantage lies in prepared defense, real-time detection, and tight orchestration with national assets.

VikingCloud’s offensive security services, such as penetration testing services, are strictly authorized and defensive in purpose. We do not conduct retaliatory cyber operations; instead, we help organizations navigate emerging policy and build stronger defenses.

H.R. 4988 may or may not become law, but it reflects a broader strategic shift in how we view cyber risk, adversaries, and the role of the private sector. For risk leaders working with VikingCloud, the priority remains: Build detection and response processes that outpace the attacker, engage the right intelligence and law enforcement partners, and communicate to your stakeholders what you will do rather than what you wish you could do.

At VikingCloud, we specialize in translating emerging policy, threat actor shifts, and governance frameworks into actionable risk programs. If you’re evaluating how emerging policy discussions may reshape your threat landscape, our team can help interpret what these shifts mean for enterprise risk, compliance responsibilities, and incident-readiness. Connect with us to explore how to align your strategy with the changing dynamics of offensive and defensive cyber operations.

Get in touch with a member of our team to discuss your options.